Security
For more than 35 years, Medicare has provided subsidized health insurance coverage to virtually all Americans when they turn 65. Younger adults can receive Medicare benefits only if they are disabled.
In recent years, various experts, policymakers, and advocates for elderly people have recommended changing the age of eligibility. Growing concerns about health insurance coverage for near elderly adults have recently prompted calls to lower the eligibility age, while increases in the normal retirement age for Social Security and concerns about Medicare's financial health, particularly as the population ages, have led others to suggest delaying it.
This brief reviews the available evidence on how changes to the age of Medicare eligibility might affect government costs and rates of health insurance coverage and employment for near elderly adults (aged 55 to 64) and young elderly adults (aged 65 to 66). It explores the tradeoffs between protecting the health and income security of older adults, containing government spending, and encouraging work. It devotes special attention to the potential impact of changes to the age of eligibility on vulnerable older Americans with limited incomes and health problems.
Current Coverage Rates for Near Elderly Adults
Like other adults, near elderly people obtain health insurance from a mix of public and private sources. In 1998, about 44 percent of adults aged 55 to 64 received coverage from their own current employers (see Figure 1 ). About 12 percent of the near elderly population received health benefits from former employers.
Many large private firms and most public sector employers provide retired employees with subsidized retiree health insurance (RHI) benefits, which generally continue until age 65, when Medicare coverage begins. RHI sometimes supplement Medicare benefits after age 65. Other retirees obtain unsubsidized continuation coverage from their former employers under the provisions of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), which requires employers with health plans and 20 or more employees to offer coverage to separating workers for up to 18 months (or 29 months if the worker is disabled), but which allows them to charge enrollees 102 percent of the group rate. In addition, 16 percent of the near elderly population (and almost one-quarter of near elderly women) received coverage from their spouses' current or former employers. In all, 72 percent of near elderly adults had workplace coverage in 1998.
Near elderly adults who lack job-related health benefits have limited insurance options. Before age 65, adults can qualify for Medicare or Medicaid benefits only if they are blind or disabled. In addition, Medicaid benefits are subject to strict income and asset tests, and Medicare benefits do not begin until at least 29 months after the onset of disability. In 1998, about 10 percent of adults aged 55 to 64 received public benefits through the Medicare or Medicaid programs ( Figure 1 ).
Many near elderly adults without coverage from employers turn to the private nongroup market. In 1998 about 8 percent of adults aged 55 to 64 purchased nongroup coverage, almost twice the rate for those at ages 35 to 54. Relying upon the private nongroup market at older ages has drawbacks, including the high price of coverage (especially for those in poor health), the limited benefits provided by many plans, and the possibility that coverage may be denied altogether.
Just under 10 percent of the near elderly population was uninsured in 1998. 1 Estimated rates of uninsurance differ across surveys, but virtually all agree that near elderly people are less likely to lack coverage than younger adults. For example, in the Urban Institute's National Survey of American Families, 13 percent of respondents aged 35 to 54 were uninsured in 1997, compared with 10 percent of those aged 55 to 64 (Brennan 2000) .
Concern about uninsurance among near elderly adults arises from the importance of coverage at older ages, not from especially low coverage rates. As individuals reach their late 50s and 60s, they become increasingly likely to develop health problems, raising health care expenses and the demand for health insurance. Average health care expenditures are twice as high for those between the ages of 55 and 64 than for those 35 to 44 (General Accounting Office 1998).
At all ages, those without insurance are less likely to seek routine and preventive care, which can lead to a variety of preventable and potentially costly health episodes. Because the incidence of many serious N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e health problems increases with age, foregoing routine care can be especially hazardous in later life.
Many of the uninsured have low incomes and health problems. In 1998, just over half (54 percent) of the uninsured were poor or near poor, with family incomes below 200 percent of the poverty line, compared with only 18 percent of the insured population (see Figure 2 ). In addition, just over one-third of near elderly adults without insurance reported fair or poor health, compared with slightly less than one-quarter of those with coverage. Fully 22 percent of the uninsured had health problems and limited incomes.
Because many of the uninsured have few economic resources, initiatives such as tax credits that aim to increase coverage by encouraging older adults to purchase private insurance are likely to be ineffective unless they include substantial subsidies. Otherwise, private insurance options will remain unaffordable for many uninsured near elderly adults.
Lowering the Age of Medicare Eligibility
One way to improve coverage for some near elderly people would be to expand Medicare benefits to nondisabled adults younger than 65. Lowering the age of automatic eligibility for Medicare would virtually eliminate uninsurance at ages 62 to 64. It would also benefit those who rely on the expensive and risky individual insurance market. In addition, the expansion of Medicare coverage would reduce employer costs for retiree health benefits and both retiree and employer costs for COBRA continuation coverage. Because COBRA beneficiaries tend to use more health services than active workers, they raise costs for employers, even though they pay premiums themselves (Fronstin 2001 A less costly approach would be to create a buy-in plan through which near elderly people could purchase Medicare coverage. These plans would in effect lower the age of Medicare eligibility, although partici-N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e pants would pay higher premiums than older beneficiaries who qualify for automatic coverage. The Clinton administration first proposed a buy-in plan in 1998 that would charge premiums approximately equal to the cost of services, and Democratic lawmakers introduced similar legislation in Congress in 2002. These proposals limited benefits to adults aged 62 to 64 (and displaced workers aged 55 to 61).
Studies of the Clinton buy-in proposal predict that about 9 percent of adults aged 62 to 64 would participate in a plan priced at $300 per month with no supplemental payments after age 65 (Johnson, Moon, and Davidoff 2002; Sheils and Chen 2001) . This represents about 37 percent of adults eligible for the buyin plan, because only those without access to other types of public insurance or employer-sponsored health benefits would qualify for the buy-in plan. However, participation rates would be much higher among those who would otherwise purchase private coverage than among those who would be uninsured, so the plan would not help the uninsured much. Simulations indicate that it would reduce the size of the uninsured population aged 62 to 64 by only about 6 to 12 percent. Nonetheless, the Clinton buyin plan would lower premium costs and improve the quality of coverage for many adults who would otherwise purchase individual coverage; the buy-in would reduce the number of adults with expensive individual policies by more than half, to less than 6 percent of the population aged 62 to 64.
A buy-in plan could better raise coverage rates if it were subsidized, particularly for low-income adults. In 2000 the Clinton administration modified its plan to include a 25 percent tax credit for premiums paid by participants. If the credits were refundable, so that all enrollees would receive the full value of the tax credit even when it exceeded their total tax liabilities, the effective price of the buy-in plan would fall to 25 percent below the average cost of services provided for all prospective participants. Low-income participants would not receive larger subsidies than high-income participants. If the tax credit is nonrefundable, low income people would receive little or no subsidy.
Health policy experts have proposed several alternative buy-in plans that would relate premiums to income. Sheils and Chen (2001) , for example, suggest capping the buy-in premium at either 5 or 10 percent of the enrollee's income. Varying premiums in these ways would substantially reduce costs for those with limited incomes while eliminating subsidies for high-income participants. The researchers estimate that limiting premiums to 5 percent of enrollee's income would reduce uninsurance rates at ages 62 to 64 by more than 38 percent.
Relating buy-in premiums to income could substantially improve coverage rates for those with low incomes. Johnson, Moon, and Davidoff (2002) compare the impact of a buy-in plan that charged a flat premium of $300 per month for all participants to a plan priced at $43.80 per month (the monthly Medicare Part B premium in 1998) for those with family incomes below 150 percent of the poverty level and $300 per month for everyone else. 2 They find that the flat pricing scheme would have no effect on uninsurance rates for the poor or near poor. However, a buy-in plan with subsidies for low-income adults would reduce uninsurance rates from 28 percent to 12 percent for poor near elderly adults and from 22 percent to 12 percent for near poor adults (see Figure 3 ). Loprest and Moon (1999) suggest a buy-in plan that would fully subsidize premiums for those with incomes below the poverty level. The subsidy would gradually fall as income rises, disappearing completely for those with incomes above 200 percent of the poverty level. Their plan would also set premiums at the community rate that would prevail if all adults aged 62 to 64 enrolled, which they estimate would be about $270 per month. Loprest and Moon estimate that their plan could reduce uninsurance among the poor by as much as 75 percent. Shea, Short, and Powell (2001) proposed an extension of the Loprest and Moon proposal. They would provide low-income adults with subsidized vouchers that could be used to buy into the Medicare program. The plan would base eligibility for the vouchers on lifetime earnings, not current income, reducing the N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e
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incentive to cut back on work hours at older ages to qualify for low-cost health insurance. Even if policymakers did not intend to subsidize benefits, they would find it almost impossible to design a cost-neutral, buy-in program, because the plan would disproportionately attract participants who expect to use many services. Relating premiums to income raises the cost of administrating the program.
Another drawback of extending Medicare benefits to non-disabled adults younger than 65, either by lowering the eligibility age outright or allowing near elderly adults to buy into the Medicare program, is that it would probably encourage some workers to retire early. By reducing or even eliminating the period during which early retirees without RHI benefits would need to purchase expensive private non-group coverage to avoid becoming uninsured, extending Medicare coverage would lower the costs of retiring. Policies that encourage retirement heighten concerns about the ability of the economy to support the growing retired population. At the same time, lowering the age of eligibility could allow older workers the freedom to leave their job and pursue a second career or become selfemployed, without worrying about the availability of health insurance coverage.
Recent estimates suggest that lowering the automatic age of Medicare eligibility to 62 would raise overall annual retirement rates among fulltime workers aged 51 to 61 from 6.9 percent to 7.4 percent, a relative increase of about 7 percent (Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 2003) .
The introduction of a buy-in program priced at $300 per month would raise overall retirement rates by only about 2 percent.
Raising the Age of Medicare Eligibility
Despite concerns about the number of uninsured older adults too young to qualify for Medicare, proposals to increase the age of Medicare eligibility continue to attract attention. Proponents argue that raising the eligibility age would N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e
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and improve the solvency of the Medicare trust fund. In addition, it would bring the age of Medicare eligibility in line with the normal retirement age for Social Security, and might encourage some individuals to remain at work and delay retirement, an increasingly important policy goal as the aging of the population reduces the share of adults below the traditional retirement age who can support the growing elderly population and pay for other government services. Opponents of an increase in the eligibility age argue that it would leave many near elderly adults uninsured or with inadequate insurance.
Many Medicare beneficiaries supplement their Medicare coverage with additional types of insurance, which generally pay at least part of the deductibles, co-payments, and premiums that Medicare charges, and which sometimes covers services excluded from Medicare, such as prescription drugs. In 1998, 31 percent of Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 to 66 received RHI benefits from their former employers, and another 23 percent purchased individual Medigap coverage (Johnson 2003) . In addition, 7 percent received Medicaid benefits, which are available to elderly adults with low income and limited assets. These rates of supplemental coverage suggest that many near elderly adults could probably maintain some type of coverage if they no longer qualified for Medicare, although some Medigap policy holders may encounter problems purchasing primary individual plans.
The remaining 31 percent of young elderly Medicare beneficiaries relied on Medicare coverage alone in 1998. 3 Many young elderly adults without additional types of insurance may have difficulty finding coverage if they lose Medicare eligibility, especially because many of those without supplemental coverage have limited economic resources. Among Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 to 66 in 1998, 33 percent of those without supplemental coverage were poor or near poor (see Figure 4) . The comparable figure is only 19 percent for those with supplemental coverage. Thus, many near elderly beneficiaries may be unable to afford private alternatives to Medicare. High school dropouts, African Americans, Hispanics, and those in fair or poor health also make up disproportionate shares of the near elderly population without supplemental health insurance coverage.
Nonetheless, recent estimates of the impact of raising the age of Medicare eligibility to 67 indicate that 91 percent of near elderly adults would find some type of alternative coverage . More than half would receive employer-sponsored coverage from their own workplace or their spouse's workplace (see Figure 5 ). Employer-sponsored coverage for the near elderly would increase relative to 3 Some, however, belonged to managed care plans, which often cover more services than the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program. N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e
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current rates primarily because the delay in Medicare eligibility would discourage some workers with health benefits on the current job from retiring. An increase in the age of Medicare eligibility to 67 would reduce annual retirement rates for workers aged 55 to 64 by about 5 percent (from 10.7 percent to 10.2 percent), higher than some estimates of the impact of increasing the normal retirement age for Social Security (Johnson 2002 ).
Rates of employer-sponsored coverage would also rise because more retirees would receive RHI benefits. In some retiree health plans, coverage ceases when beneficiaries become eligible for Medicare coverage, so more near elderly adults would qualify for RHI benefits if Medicare eligibility did not begin until age 67. Estimates of the impact of raising the Medicare age to 67 assume that employers would continue the terms of the insurance coverage they offer to retirees or to active workers. In particular, the estimates assume that employers would pick up the additional costs of extending retiree health benefits to 65-and 66-year-olds until Medicare began at age 67. Costs would rise even for employers whose RHI plans continue after Medicare coverage begins, because they would be providing primary coverage for near elderly retirees, not the supplemental wrap-around coverage that they currently provide. About one in five near elderly adults would purchase individual coverage if the age of Medicare eligibility were raised to 67 . However, the high cost of these individual policies would create financial difficulties for many near elderly adults, especially those in poor health. For a standard PPO plan with a $500 deductible and a 20 percent coinsurance rate, mean monthly premiums in 1998 for those aged 63 to 64 with two or more serious health conditions ranged from $540 to $791 for women and from $790 to $908 for men, depending on whether the policyholder smoked. These estimates are based on price quotes collected through an insurance website from insurers throughout the country (see Table One ).
Because virtually everyone goes on Medicare when they turn 65, reliable premium data for individual primary coverage for adults aged 65 and older do not exist. However, assuming that premiums would increase with age at the same rate after age 65 as before, the quotes obtained for adults in their early Source: Davidoff and Johnson (2003) . Note: Coverage is determined by the following hierarchy: public insurance, own employer, spouse employer, and private nongroup.
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60s imply that mean monthly premiums at ages 65 and 66 for those with two or more chronic conditions would range from $546 to $811 for women and from $829 to $915 for men. Because individual coverage is so expensive, almost half of the near elderly people who would purchase individual policies after a delay in the age of Medicare eligibility, or about 9 percent of the overall population ages 65 and 66, could only afford policies that provided limited coverage, leaving them vulnerable to high out-of-pocket expenses in the event of illness or injury.
An increase in the age of Medicare eligibility would leave 9 percent of the young elderly population uninsured. This estimate assumes that private insurers would offer individual policies to all adults ages 65 and 66 who could afford and were willing to pay the premium costs. However, some adults with health problems are unable to find coverage at any price, and those who can obtain coverage are often offered policies that exclude pre-existing conditions (Chollet and Kirk 1998; Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas 2001) . Nonetheless, the simulated uninsurance rate among the young elderly population seems plausible, since it equals the actual level of uninsurance among those aged 62 to 64, and insurers are probably not that much less willing to cover those aged 65 to 66 than those aged 62 to 64.
Raising the age of eligibility would hit those with limited incomes especially hard. For example, almost one in four poor and near poor near elderly adults would lack coverage (see Figure 6 ). Creating a Medicare buy-in plan for the near elderly would mitigate the adverse effects of an increase in the automatic age of eligibility, but it would not reduce uninsurance rates for low-income adults unless premiums were heavily subsidized. For example, if Medicare premiums for adults ages 65 and 66 were set at $300 per montha price that many experts agree would just cover the cost of services provided-a buy-in plan would not reduce uninsurance rates at all for the poor or near poor, because most could not afford to purchase Medicare coverage. However, the buy-in plan could cut uninsurance rates to only 9 percent for the poor and 13 percent for the near poor if premiums were set at about $45 per month for those with incomes below 150 percent of the poverty line. Note: A serious health problem is defined as diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart problems, or stroke. Source: Johnson and Davidoff (2000) , based on data collected from an online insurance service.
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current rules (Wittenburg, Stapleton, and Scrivner 2000) . The reduction in the total cost of public insurance would be somewhat lower, because some near elderly people would move from Medicare to Medicaid.
Medicare enrollment would fall faster than costs, because many of the most expensive beneficiariesincluding the oldest old and those with disabilities-would remain in the program. According to one study, raising the age of eligibility would reduce Medicare enrollment by 11 percent and Medicare expenditures by 4.3 percent (Wittenburg, Stapleton, and Scrivner 2000) .
Conclusions
Setting the age for Medicare eligibility is necessarily arbitrary. 
? is this right
N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f S o c i a l I n s u r a n c e Policies that would reduce or eliminate Social Security benefits for early retirees could have adverse consequences for older workers in poor health. This Brief documents the health and financial status of people aged 62-64 who receive reduced Social Security benefits as retired workers, spouses, and widowed spouses. Although most of these early retirees do not have a serious health condition, almost half report some type of health problem. About 25 percent are estimated to have health problems that substantially impair their ability to work. When compared to other early retirees, those who have severe health problems have lower lifetime earnings, are more reliant on Social Security benefits, have fewer financial assets, and are less likely to have health insurance. About 12 percent of early retirees are estimated to meet the strict disability criteria for receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Many of them do not receive DI because they lack sufficient work histories to qualify. Another larger subgroup does not meet the test of low income and limited financial assets for means-tested SSI disability benefits. About as many 62-64 year olds classified as severely disabled receive early retirement benefits as receive disability benefits from DI or SSI. The evidence suggests that Social Security early retirement benefits serve as a substantial, albeit unofficial, disability program for some early retirees.
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Older Work ers Face More Serio us Cons equen ces From Work place Injur ies
By Jeff Biddle, Leslie I. Boden, and Robert T. Reville Comparing the outcomes of workplace injuries in three states -California, Washington, and Wisconsin-s uggests that older workers are more likely than their younger counterparts to have permanent disabilities as a result of those injuries. This is true even though older workers have fewer workplace accidents. In addition, older workers suffer larger wage losses over the first few years after injury, they have lower replacement rates from workers' compensatio n benefits, and they experience more injury-related days of non-employm ent.
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Workers' compensation is a state-administ ered system that provides benefits, without regard to fault, to workers injured on the job. This brief explores the relationship between age and the consequences of workplace injuries. Other studies have found that the likelihood of workplace injuries declines with age. But, when injuries do occur, older workers suffer more restricted activity days and bedridden days than do younger workers, on average (Burton and Spieler, 2001 ).
This study used state administrative data on workers' compensation claims that the researchers linked to longitudinal earnings records. This approach enabled estimates of lost earnings of injured or ill workers.
Permanen t Disability More Common Among Older Injured Workers
Workers' compensation benefits are set by formulas that differ from state to state. California, Wisconsin, and Washington, like most other states, pay both temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. TTD benefits are intended to provide income support during recovery. PPD benefits are intended to compensate workers for the losses associated with a permanently disabling workplace injury.
States also pay benefits for permanent total disability but these cases are relatively rare and are not included in this analysis. Nationally, benefits for permanent total disabilities are paid to less than 0.5 percent of all injured workers who receive workers' compensation cash benefits (National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2000).
In all three states, older injured workers are more likely than their younger counterparts to receive benefits for permanent, as opposed to only temporary, disability (Table 1) . This is consistent with other findings that older workers suffer more lasting consequences of workplace injuries. The figures in Table 1 show the number of workers receiving permanent disability benefits as a percent of all injured workers with either temporary or permanent disability benefits. In Wisconsin, those with benefits for permanent disability account for 28 percent of injured workers age 55 and older compared to 21 percent of those ages 35-54. The increase in permanent disability with age is largest in Washington, where the proportion of injured workers who receive permanent 
Ensur ing Healt h and Incom e Securi ty for an Aging Workf orce
By Virginia Reno and June Eichner
America's health and income security systems will face new challenges in the next two decades as baby boomers pass through the second half of their work lives. At older ages, the risk of illness and disability rises, employment-b ased health insurance costs more, and involuntary job loss takes on new dimensions. At the same time, employment relationships are changing and federal policies are seeking to encourage people to work longer and delay retirement. Existing health and income security systems -Social Security, Medicare, workers' compensation , unemploymen t insurance, employer-sponsored health insurance, pensions and disability insurance -tend to be analyzed one at a time. Yet, changes in one program can have unintended consequences on others, as well as on the fortunes and misfortunes of workers and their families. This Brief is the first in a new Academy series that will examine cross-cutting issues in ensuring health and income security for an aging workforce. 
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Sec ur ity
Policymakers are focusing on the challenges of financing the upcoming retirement for baby boomers. Many workers and their families, however, will encounter risks to their income and health security before they reach retirement age. To date, these risks and America's system for covering them have not been examined in any coordinated way. The Academy's project, Ensuring Health and Income Security for an Aging Work Force, takes a cross-cutting approach to examining ways to provide continuity in income and health care coverage for working-aged Americans and their families.
What are the risks to health and income security?
With a strong economy, many Americans in the second half of their work lives can expect to enter retirement in good physical and financial health. Yet, unforeseen events can upset the best-laid plans. Events that jeopardize health, health care coverage, and secure income before retirement age include:
■ Lack of affordable health coverage or loss of coverage due to job change or changes in employer's plan;
■ Discrimination in health care coverage associated with age, disability or pre-existing conditions;
■ Loss of income and health insurance at widowhood or divorce;
■ Job loss due to economic downturns, company mergers, or employer restructuring or relocation;
■ Stagnant or declining wages due to skill depreciation;
■ Care-giving responsibility for seriously ill family members or friends;
■ Acute illness, chronic conditions, and costly health care;
■ Work-related injuries or impairments; and
Health Insurance Coverage of People in the Ten Years Before Medicare Eligibility
By Katherine Swartz and Betsey Stevenson
The number of Americans 55 to 64 years old will increase dramatically as the baby boomers enter this age group. In 1999, 23.1 million Americans were 55-64 years old. This number is expected to grow to 35.0 million by 2010 as the first of the baby boomers reach Medicare age, and then swell to 42.5 million by 2020 (Chart 1). As the baby boomers age, their health care needs will intensify, while at the same time they will undergo employment and life cycle changes, including voluntary or forced retirement, caring for aging parents, or the loss of a spouse. At a time in their lives when health insurance is particularly important, such changes increase their risk of being without health insurance.
Examining those presently 55 to 64 years old A decade remains before the oldest members of the baby boom generation begin to be eligible for Medicare. A number of these baby boomers will retire between the ages of 55 to 64, prior to qualifying for Medicare. Some will retire by choice; others will lose their job involuntarily; many will accept part-time or contract employment. As their employment situation is altered, many risk losing their employer-sponsored health insurance. The soon-to-be large number of baby boomers in the 55-64 age group prompts a look at who is at risk for being uninsured, the types of health insurance coverage they have, and the characteristics of those with each type of health insurance.
For people between the ages of 55 to 64, labor market participation, income level, health status, gender, marital status, educational attainment, and race are all associated with having health insurance. Though these characteristics are related to each other, income, educational attainment, and health status have the largest effects on having health insurance, as well as the type of insurance coverage a 55-64 year old has. Thus, the "more fortunate"-those who are relatively healthy, with higher educational attainment and higher incomes -are more likely to have employer-sponsored or individually purchased insurance; the "less fortunate"-those who are less healthy, less educated and lower income -are more likely to have public insurance or be uninsured. 
and Emily Spieler
After rising sharply in the 1980s, workers' compensation costs and benefits declined during the 1990s. The recent decline may reflect, in part, a decline in the availability and adequacy of these benefits. Workers in the second half of their work lives are particularly likely to be affected by these changes. Although workers' compensation continues to compensate workers for acute short-term injuries, the availability of benefits for permanent disabilities associated with aging appears to be declining in many states. This trend is likely to shift benefit costs to other social and private insurance. To the extent that other programs do not replace earnings lost due to permanent disability, these costs are shifted to workers and their families. 
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Workers' compensation pays partial wage-replacement and medical benefits to workers who become disabled by work-related injuries and diseases (Box 1). This brief summarizes policy changes and issues facing workers' compensation, with a focus on aging workers. Workers' compensation programs draw few overt distinctions based on the claimant's age. Perhaps more important than overt age distinctions, however, is the inescapable fact that older workers are different from younger workers. Compared to younger workers, the data available indicate that older workers:
■ Are less prone to injuries resulting from traumatic events; ■ Are more prone to impairments associated with aging, including heart disease and back conditions; ■ Take longer to heal and have greater impairments resulting from injuries; and, ■ May experience more restricted mobility in the labor market as a result of occupational disabilities.
Workers' compensation is second in size only to Social Security disability insurance in providing benefits to disabled workers. In 1998, workers' compensation programs paid $41.7 billion in cash and medical benefits compared to $75.8 billion for Social Security disability insurance and associated Medicare benefits.
Workers' compensation is different from Social Security disability insurance in several ways. For workers' compensation:
■ The injury or illness must be work-related; ■ Benefits are paid for temporary and partial disability, as well as long-term disability; ■ Each state has its own program, with no federal guidelines; ■ Benefits are administered through private insurers and self-insurance, as well as state run funds; ■ Claims involve a great deal of litigation in some jurisdictions; and, ■ Disputed cases can be, and often are, resolved by compromise and release agreements that pay a compromised amount in a lump sum and release the employer from further liability for cash benefits and usually from future medical benefits.
Costs Rose in the 1980s; Declined in the 1990s
In 1998, total employers' costs for workers' compensation were $52.1 billion while total benefits paid to workers were $41.7 billion. The $10.4 billion difference between benefits and employers' costs is attrib-
Recen t Trend s in Retire e Health Benef its and the Role of COBR A Cover age by Paul Fronstin and Virginia Reno
Employers are cutting back on retiree health benefits and requiring more cost sharing from former employees to pay for these benefits. Yet the proportion of retirees who say they have employment-b ased coverage has been stable in the 1990s. Because some of the cut-backs in retiree health benefits are applied only to newly hired workers, the impact on retirees may become evident only gradually over the next few decades as boomers retire. To what degree is COBRA coverage, which retirees pay for themselves, becoming a substitute for employer-subs idized retiree health benefits? Questions about the role of COBRA for early retirees and disabled individuals remain -including how they pay for it and what they do for coverage when COBRA ends.
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Retiree health benefits were originally offered in the late 1940s and the 1950s, when business was booming and there were few retirees in relation to the number of active workers. The benefits emerged as part of collective bargaining agreements, and employers were willing to provide them because the cost was a small proportion of total compensation . With the enactment of Medicare in 1965, employers' obligations for retiree health benefits became smaller because employers were able to integrate these benefits with Medicare. Financing the supplemental benefits was of little concern. In more recent years, however, slower growth in the active work force, coupled with increasing life spans, left many employers with higher ratios of retirees to active workers. At the same time, advances in health care technology and rising health care costs caused retiree health liabilities to rise.
Today, retiree health benefits are of two types. Early retiree benefits generally provide bridge coverage until workers become eligible for Medicare at age 65, while Medicare supplemental benefits for retirees age 65 and older cover some of the costs that are not covered by Medicare. The plans for early retirees cost more on average. In 2000 the average annual cost of retiree health benefits for those under age 65 was $5,537 compared to $2,319 for retirees age 65 and older (William M. Mercer, 2000a Policies that would reduce or eliminate Social Security benefits for early retirees could have adverse consequences for older workers in poor health. This Brief documents the health and financial status of people aged 62-64 who receive reduced Social Security benefits as retired workers, spouses, and widowed spouses. Although most of these early retirees do not have a serious health condition, almost half report some type of health problem. About 25 percent are estimated to have health problems that substantially impair their ability to work. When compared to other early retirees, those who have severe health problems have lower lifetime earnings, are more reliant on Social Security benefits, have fewer financial assets, and are less likely to have health insurance. About 12 percent of early retirees are estimated to meet the strict disability criteria for receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Many of them do not receive DI because they lack sufficient work histories to qualify. Another larger subgroup does not meet the test of low income and limited financial assets for means-tested SSI disability benefits. About as many 62-64 year olds classified as severely disabled receive early retirement benefits as receive disability benefits from DI or SSI. The evidence suggests that Social Security early retirement benefits serve as a substantial, albeit unofficial, disability program for some early retirees.
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Proposals to promote long-range solvency of the Social Security program often call for increasing the ages at which retirement benefits become available. The full benefit age has traditionally been age 65 and is gradually rising to age 67.1 Early retirement benefits remain available at age 62, but benefits claimed at that age will incur larger reductions as the full benefit age rises. Traditionally, benefits claimed at age 62 have been reduced by 20 percent. When the full benefit age reaches age 67, benefits claimed at age 62 will be reduced by 30 percent and those claimed at age 65 will be reduced by 13.3 percent. Proposals have been made to raise the full benefit age beyond 67 and further reduce early entitlement benefits, or to increase the early retirement age. 
